Zoran Milanović as “Presidential Opposition Leader:” More Blessing, More Curse?

by Oliver Kannenberg (Institute for Parliamentary Research, Berlin)

The presidential elections were already the third round of voting for Croatian citizens in 2024. Prior to that, early parliamentary elections had been held on 17 April, followed by the European Parliament elections in June. In both cases, the conservative Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ), led by Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, came out on top. However, the tide turned in the presidential elections: Zoran Milanović, nominated by the Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske (Social Democratic Party of Croatia, SDP), won by a significant margin, clinching a so-called “landslide victory.”

Table 1: Official results of the presidential election 2024/2025
Candidate	Party affiliation	1st round result	2nd round result
Zoran Milanović	Independent (SDP)	797,938 (49.68%)	1,122,859 (74.68%)
Dragan Primorac	Independent (HDZ)	314,663 (19.59%)	380,752 (25.32%)
Marija Selak Raspudić	Independent	150,435 (9.37%)
Ivana Kekin	Možemo!	144,533 (9.00%)
Tomislav Jonjić	Independent (HSP)	82,787 (5.15%)
Miro Bulj	MOST	62,127 (3.87%)
Branka Lozo	DOMiNO	39,321 (2.45%)
Niko Tokić Kartelo	Independent	14,409 (0.90%)
Možemo! (We can do it!) is a left-green party that emerged from various civic movements, whereas MOST (Bridge) is difficult to categorise in a general political spectrum. It advocates a liberal-conservative to national-conservative policy with occasional eurosceptic elements. DOMiNO (Dom i Nacionalno Okupljanje, Home and National Rally) is a right-wing party.

A key question is how Milanović will interpret his office in the next five years and what impact this might have on the Croatian political landscape. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that the Croatian president’s basic powers are rather modest, that is, limited. In addition to ceremonial and foreign policy powers, it is primarily procedural confirmation and veto powers that are in the hands of the office. In an international comparison of ‘presidential powers’ between 0 (weak) and 1 (strong), Croatia is attested a value of 0.372 for the constitutionally ascribed powers (for comparison: France 0.465, Austria 0.346, Germany 0.133).[1] In the course of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Milanović used his presidential powers concerning the armed forces to prevent Croatian soldiers from participating in training and exercise missions for Ukrainian soldiers.[2] This case can be seen as a fundamental example of Milanović’s interpretation of the office, which will not change even in his second term. In combination with his outspoken manner, it is to be expected that Milanović will be the central opposition figure to the HDZ-led government and in particular to his nemesis Andrej Plenković. The two have dominated Croatian politics for more than a decade and will continue to do so – barring any resignations – at least until the end of this decade.

As a result, Milanović, already in office since 2020, will remain President of Croatia for another five years. Nevertheless, interpreting the result of the second round of the presidential elections as a victory for the SDP would be misleading. Yet that is what the new leader of the Social Democrats, Siniša Hajdaš Dončić, did shortly after the second round, only to be promptly corrected by some political observers. The decisive victory was primarily due to Milanović’s high popularity. At the same time, the conservative opponent Dragan Primorac, a former minister for health, education and sports, was unable to present an attractive alternative. This is precisely where Zoran Milanović’s great strength lies. Although his rhetoric is often highly populist and occasionally offensive, he has repeatedly succeeded in articulating domestic political problems and the HDZ government’s failings in a clear and easily understandable way. Furthermore, he is programmatically highly flexible and appeals to various voter groups beyond the Social Democrats’ core clientele.

In his position as HDZ leader, Plenković emerged strengthened from the super election year due to his successes in the Croatian and European parliamentary elections. Moreover, as Prime Minister, he once again managed to survive almost unscathed any scandal and controversy involving his government as a whole or one of his ministers. This pattern runs through Plenković’s entire term of office, during which a large number of cabinet ministers and high-ranking government officials had to resign due to scandals and misconduct. Another noteworthy aspect from an international perspective is that the HDZ entered into a coalition with the right-wing extremist Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement, DP) after the parliamentary elections in spring 2024. While in many other European countries this kind of coalition between conservatives and right-wing (extreme) parties has all too often been to the electoral detriment of the conservative party, no comparable phenomenon has been observed in Croatia. On the contrary: internal conflicts led to a faction splitting off from the homeland movement, leaving a significantly weakened party behind and making it somewhat easier for the HDZ and Andrej Plenković to govern.

In the Croatian parliament, the Sabor, the SDP is by far the largest parliamentary party group (PPG) of the opposition. The other two relevant opposition parties are the liberal-conservative MOST and the left-green Možemo. There have been recurring disagreements between Možemo and the SDP, which in some cases vie for the favour of similar voter groups, which have made joint opposition work considerably more difficult. However, such cooperation would probably be necessary to stand a chance against the HDZ. In the 35 years since Croatian independence, a prime minister with an HDZ party membership has ruled for 27 years. As a result, the party and the state are more closely intertwined in some areas than should be the case in a democratic constitutional state. As a decidedly Christian democratic party, the HDZ can also claim the support of the Catholic Church, which remains in at least some parts of society influential.

It is a Herculean task for the opposition parties to challenge these deeply rooted structures, and in tackling it, Milanović can be both a curse and a blessing. In addition to his role as head of state, his sometimes unbridled temper gets him additional attention and headlines. These are not necessarily helpful in terms of content, but they can be used to continually draw attention to grievances. By contrast, the more objective press conferences held by the opposition factions in the Sabor have so far all too often fallen on deaf ears. Milanović could be an important source of ideas for the party groups, but his own pride and ego often outshines them. This tense relation is expected to intensify as his current term continues, given that he is ineligible to run for a subsequent presidential term due to the two-term limit. At the end of their respective terms, both Milanović and Plenković will be of a (political) age that would not preclude them from standing for another parliamentary election. It remains to be seen whether the two opponents will officially stand against each other in four years.[3]

All in all, there is little to suggest that the personnel dichotomy of Croatian politics will change much in the near future. Despite being already in 2025, the Croatian super election year is not yet over. In May, mayors and city councils are elected in over 550 cities and municipalities, as well as prefects in the 20 counties and other important offices on the local administration level. For the first time in a long while, neither Milanović nor Plenković will be the centre of attention.

Oliver Kannenberg is a research associate at the Institute for Parliamentary Research (IParl) in Berlin. During the winter semester 2025, he was a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Southeast European Studies (CSEES) in Graz. His research and teaching activities focus on comparative parliamentary studies and the political systems of Southeastern Europe.

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[1] Doyle D, Elgie R. 2016. Maximizing the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power. British Journal of Political Science 46(4):731-741. DOI:10.1017/S0007123414000465.

[2] The decisions of the president in these matters can be overruled by a two-thirds parliamentary majority. In the case in question, however, this was not achieved.

[3] In the recent parliamentary elections, Milanovic’s ‘unofficial’ candidacy for the post of prime minister was already the subject of much confusion and turmoil. See: Kannenberg, O.  2024. Croatia Moves to the (Far)-Right – The Parliamentary Election. Southeast Europe in Focus 7/5. Jg. https://www.sogde.org/site/assets/files/30940/240513_sog_see-focus_2-2024_240416.pdf