By Gabriele Leone
The conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state represents one of the longest-running low-intensity wars in contemporary history, with a death toll exceeding 40,000 and a significant impact on Turkish and Middle Eastern politics and society. Rooted in ethnic tensions and the repression of Kurdish cultural and political rights in Turkey, the PKK’s struggle has undergone profound transformations over time, evolving from a demand for independence to a call for political autonomy and identity recognition.
The recent statement by Abdullah Öcalan, the historic leader of the PKK, calling on Kurdish fighters to cease armed struggle and disband the organization, signifies an event of great historical importance. However, this turning point cannot be interpreted in isolation. While it indicates a potential break from the movement’s traditional strategy, it also raises questions about both its actual implementation and the underlying motivations. Öcalan’s statement is situated within a rapidly changing geopolitical and national framework characterized by the strengthening of the Turkish state, the increasing marginalization of armed organizations in the region, and the evolving political demands of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. Historical analysis of the conflict highlights how Turkish political elites have instrumentalized the Kurdish issue over the decades to consolidate their power, alternating between phases of openness and dialogue and periods of harsh repression. The failed peace process (2013-2015) and the return to hostilities after the June 2015 elections have demonstrated that negotiations with the PKK have often been subordinated to domestic political calculations rather than a genuine will to resolve the conflict. Internationally, the Kurdish issue intersects with the strategies of major powers, particularly the United States and Russia, which have exploited Kurdish groups, especially in Syria and Iraq, as tools of geopolitical influence. The fragmentation of the Kurdish movement itself, marked by diverse actors such as the PKK, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê, PJAK) in Iran, further complicates the picture and raises doubts about Öcalan’s actual ability to impose a unilateral cessation of armed struggle.
Metamorphosis in Motion: The Kurdish Movement at a Political Crossroads
After tracing the PKK’s origins and historical evolution, it is essential to focus on a moment of particular significance in the present: the recent statement by Abdullah Öcalan, the movement’s leader and founder, representing a potentially decisive turning point in the party’s political trajectory. This call, coming decades after the initiation of the armed struggle, is part of a radically changed context, both regionally and within the movement itself. Öcalan’s statement cannot simply be interpreted as a call for appeasement; rather, it signifies the culmination of a lengthy process of ideological and strategic transformation initiated by the leader himself since the late 1990s. In the three pages drafted from Imrali prison after twenty-six years of imprisonment, Öcalan calls upon the movement to embark on a process of internal discourse aimed at the conclusive renunciation of the armed struggle and the subsequent dissolution of the PKK. He characterizes this initiative as an act of historical accountability, emerging from the revolutionary trajectory that has informed the party’s evolution from its foundational Marxist-Leninist and nationalist doctrines to an innovative paradigm known as democratic confederalism. This framework is predicated on principles of direct participation, pluralism, ecological sustainability, and community self-governance. Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognize that this transformation transcends mere theoretical considerations. Öcalan clarifies that the PKK was born in an era- the 20th century- characterized by global violence, the denial of Kurdish reality, and the absence of democratic avenues for political expression. Against this backdrop, the organization found social support and established the legitimacy of its armed struggle. Yet, the current context has changed fundamentally. The practices of confederalism have emerged in Kurdish refugee camps in Iraq and especially in the Rojava experience in Syria, where the fight against ISIS has brought international visibility to Kurdish forces and new political legitimacy to their project.Öcalan stresses that “the language of peace and democratic society must develop based on this reality”. Still, his appeal also signifies a clear transfer of responsibility. In fact, he addresses the message directly to the Turkish government, particularly to Devlet Bahçeli- the leader of the MHP, an ultranationalist party and government partner- as well as to President Erdoğan. They are entrusted with the test of institutional sincerity. If the PKK is prepared to end its “historic role”, it is up to the state to demonstrate that the response will not involve further repression. So far, the signs point in the opposite direction. The cautious reopening of dialogue with the PKK through some diplomatic channels has been followed by an increase in repressive actions: mass arrests, commissariats in Kurdish municipalities, and restrictions on the press and freedom of expression. Within this framework, Öcalan’s initiative risks being isolated, if not neutralized, in the absence of a credible political framework for disarmament and reconciliation (Cruciati, 2025).
However, the response may not come only from Ankara. Even within the Kurdish movement, the statement raises crucial questions. The PKK has made armed struggle not just a tool of defense but a means of its own political theorizing, from resistance against ISIS in Shengal to building self-rule in Rojava. Therefore, the movement’s future will depend on its ability to embrace its founder’s call without relinquishing the territorial roots and political prominence it has established through years of conflict below.
The Regional Stakes of Öcalan’s Declaration
The discourse surrounding disarmament specifically targets the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, while the Syrian affiliate, known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG), remains unaddressed. Mazlum Abdi, the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has clarified that the directive does not apply to the Syrian entity, thus casting doubt on the initiative’s comprehensiveness. Furthermore, it is plausible that some Kurdish militants may choose to align themselves with the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), the PKK’s Iranian counterpart, rather than surrender their weapons (Phillips, 2017).
Another crucial aspect is the role of international actors. The United States, which has supported the YPG in the fight against ISIS, may view reconciliation between the PKK and Ankara with suspicion, fearing it could undermine its influence in the region. Simultaneously, Russia and Iran, historical adversaries of Turkey, might seek to exploit the situation to strengthen their positions in Syria and Iraq (Gürbey et al., 2017).
Öcalan’s Appeal: From Revolution to Resolution
Öcalan justified the founding of the PKK within the context of the Cold War, Soviet influence on leftist organizations, and the cultural and political repression experienced by Kurds in Turkey (Gürbey, 2021). Over time, the PKK shifted from pursuing Kurdish independence to advocating for a model of administrative autonomy and “democratic confederalism”, inspired by the theories of Murray Bookchin (Gerber & Brincat, 2018). However, the armed struggle gradually diminished in effectiveness and legitimacy, prompting Öcalan to acknowledge the necessity for strategic change. Joost Jongerden (2025) observes that since his arrest in 1999, a parallel process of unpublicized yet explicit negotiations has commenced between the Turkish state and Öcalan. These negotiations, while secret, have addressed critical issues, such as the possibility of PKK disarmament and the interpretation of Öcalan’s proposed “cultural conditions” and “democratic republic” (Jongerden, 2025). These discussions have demonstrated that Öcalan’s willingness to pursue a political solution has never diminished; however, it has consistently been at odds with the Turkish opposition, which has been reluctant to reach a concrete agreement at various stages. Concurrently, geopolitical developments have significantly influenced Öcalan’s strategic choices. The strengthening of the Turkish state and diminishing international support for armed movements have complicated the maintenance of the same guerrilla tactics. The growing emphasis on diplomacy over military action has prompted Öcalan to consider new political perspectives. As Jongerden notes, a pivotal moment in this negotiation process was the secret talks between the Turkish government and the PKK, held from 2007 to 2011 and from 2013 to 2015, facilitated by the Oslo Center (Jongerden, 2025).
Additionally, as Jongerden points out, growing economic pressure and tensions with the West have led Ankara to reconsider its position on the PKK. A cease-fire could have reduced the need for large military expenditures and improved Turkey’s image on the international stage, facilitating the creation of new economic and diplomatic alliances. However, when negotiations appeared to be on a positive path, as in the case of the Dolmabahçe Agreement in 2013, Erdoğan’s intransigence and backtracking undermined the possibility of a lasting political solution (Jorgenden, 2025). The conditions the PKK sets for disarmament are as follows:
- The creation of a suitable democratic and legal environment.
- The decision on disarmament should be made through a Congress, with Öcalan in charge.
- Complete freedom for Öcalan to communicate without restrictions.
These challenging conditions illustrate how Öcalan’s declaration does not suggest an immediate end to the conflict. Furthermore, the Turkish government’s response to these demands will be vital for the initiative’s success. If Ankara persists in criminalizing the Kurdish movement without providing concrete concessions, peace is likely to remain merely an illusion (Marcus, 2007).
Peace or Power Play? Erdoğan’s Approach to the Kurdish Question
President Erdoğan’s attempt to resolve the Kurdish conflict through a negotiation process cannot be separated from Turkey’s broader political and strategic context. Historically, initiatives regarding the Kurdish issue have often been employed by Turkish governments as tools for power consolidation rather than genuine attempts at reconciliation. An analysis of Erdoğan’s political trajectory and his policies toward the PKK suggests that his current approach to the Kurdish conflict may primarily stem from electoral interests and the need to navigate internal and external pressures on Turkey. Over the past two decades, Erdoğan has employed flexible strategies toward the Kurdish movement, alternating between periods of negotiation and phases of repression.
Despite conciliatory statements toward Öcalan, the Turkish leadership continues to adopt a securitarian approach to the Kurdish movement. The arrests of Kurdish politicians, the forced closure of parties linked to the Kurdish cause, and the military operations against the YPG in Syria raise questions about the sincerity of the peace initiative. Academically, this apparent contradiction can be understood through the concept of “peace as a façade” (Galtung, 1996), which suggests that some governments employ peace processes not to resolve conflicts but to temporarily reduce domestic pressure and enhance their international image. In this context, Erdoğan may seek to frame the end of the PKK’s armed struggle as a political victory while maintaining a repressive policy toward Kurdish institutions. Erdoğan’s initiative not only functions as a domestic strategy but also aligns with a broader geopolitical scenario. Turkey is currently facing a significant economic crisis characterized by high inflation and declining foreign investment. An agreement with the Kurds could enhance the perception of the country’s internal stability and open avenues for new economic agreements with the European Union and the United States.
Furthermore, the Kurdish issue is intricately tied to Turkey’s relations with NATO. The United States has backed the YPG in the fight against ISIS, creating tensions with Ankara, which views the YPG as an offshoot of the PKK- considered a terrorist organization internationally. If the Turkish government succeeds in positioning an agreement with the PKK as a definitive solution to the conflict, it could compel Washington to lessen its support for the Syrian Kurds, thereby bolstering Turkey’s strategic position in the region. On the other hand, Russia and Iran might regard this move with suspicion, fearing that increased stability in Turkey could reduce their influence in the region. This complex geopolitical context complicates assessing whether Öcalan’s proposed cease-fire will be implemented or merely serve as a cosmetic operation.
However, several factors could hinder this scenario: failure to meet the PKK’s conditions, such as establishing a proper legal environment and ensuring freedom for Öcalan, could derail the peace process. Some factions within the PKK might reject Öcalan’s approach and continue the armed struggle, further fragmenting the Kurdish movement. Additionally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Erdoğan’s ally, could oppose significant concessions to the Kurds, compelling the president to reverse course. Alternatively, if the ceasefire proves to be merely an electoral gimmick, the Kurds could retaliate with new forms of political and social resistance, escalating internal tensions in the country. The lack of a genuine democratization process presents an additional hurdle to achieving lasting peace. The crackdown on Kurdish politicians and activists, the ongoing enforcement of the state of emergency, and the closure of parties associated with the Kurdish cause illustrate how Ankara continues to view the Kurdish issue in securitarian terms rather than as a matter of rights and political representation. Without a fundamental transformation of Turkish policies, there is a danger that the conflict will not be resolved but merely reconfigured into different forms, such as the criminalization of Kurdish political leaders and the restriction of civil freedoms. Suppose the peace process is not accompanied by a genuine change in Ankara’s policies and a clear willingness to recognize the political and cultural rights of the Kurds. In that case, there is a risk that Öcalan’s appeal will remain a statement with no real consequences. The history of the Kurdish conflict has demonstrated that superficial solutions do not lead to lasting stabilization but only to a temporary redefinition of power dynamics.
In conclusion, the possibility of the Kurdish conflict finding a permanent solution depends on several factors that extend far beyond Öcalan’s expressed willingness to end the armed struggle. Without a concrete commitment from the Turkish government to guarantee rights and political representation for the Kurds and without clear international support for a structured peace process, the war may not end but may change form. The illusion of peace imposed from above without genuine political change risks creating new tensions and the emergence of new forms of resistance. The illusion of a peace imposed from above without real political change risks creating new tensions and the emergence of new forms of resistance. Abdullah Öcalan’s statement can be read as the initial phase of a possible new path. With his appeal, the historic leader of the Kurdish movement seems to have deliberately passed the baton to Ankara, calling the central government-and the entire Turkish political system-to a test of historical maturity. It is now up to state institutions, but also to those parties that call themselves democratic, to embark on a credible path toward demilitarization of the conflict, removing the political and social conditions that, from the PKK’s point of view, have for decades justified the use of armed struggle.
The PKK still exists, and its eventual dissolution- if it ever happens- can only be gradual, the result of a process consisting of negotiations, guarantees, recognition, and both legal and political transformations. In this perspective, the movement will also have to deeply question itself, rethinking its practices, language, and strategies. Conversely, the dissolution of the armed PKK would necessitate a reevaluation of the Turkish state’s security framework. The eradication of the predominant Kurdish militant organization would, at least theoretically, strip the judiciary and the state’s repressive apparatus of a pivotal instrument in the systematic criminalization of Kurdish and progressive movements.. It would therefore represent a delicate transition for the establishment, which would have to decide whether to continue governing through the logic of “permanent emergency” or finally open up to an inclusive democratic horizon. Finally, it is clear that this conflict extends beyond Turkey’s borders and influences the broader region. The PKK is rooted in Iraq and has deep ties with other Kurdish actors in Syria and Iran; thus, any process of disarmament and reconciliation will necessarily have to consider the geopolitical dynamics of the entire Middle East as well. The historical significance of Öcalan’s statement will be measurable not only in terms of the Turkish response but also in how the region reacts to a potential end to the armed phase of the Kurdish question. In an era marked by low-intensity wars, democratic crises, and distrust of institutions, Öcalan’s call for disarmament and historical responsibility presents not only a political challenge but also a test case for the entire concept of nonviolent transformation in a region fraught with ongoing conflicts. Like any beginning, it does not guarantee an outcome. However, it does compel one to consider the possibility of change instead of overlooking it.
References:
Cruciati, C. (2025, February 28). L’annuncio di Ocalan: «Abbassiamo le armi e sciogliamo il Pkk» | il manifesto. Il Manifesto. https://ilmanifesto.it/lannuncio-di-ocalan-abbassiamo-le-armi-e-sciogliamo-il-pkk
Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446221631
Gerber, D., & Brincat, S. (2018). When Öcalan met Bookchin: The Kurdish Freedom Movement and the Political Theory of Democratic Confederalism. Geopolitics, 26(4), 973–997. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1508016
Jongerden, J. (2025, March 5). In search of an interlocutor: Abdullah Öcalan’s call for a political solution. The Contrapuntal. https://thecontrapuntal.com/abdullah-ocalans-call-for-a-political-solution/
Marcus, A. (2007). Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. NYU Press
Phillips, D. L. (2017). The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East.
Tezcür, G. M. (2016). Violence and Nationalist Mobilization: The Onset of the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey.
Gabriele Leone is a researcher specializing in political philosophy and biopolitics, particularly regarding Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish minority. His Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Lapland examined power dynamics between the Turkish nation-state and the Kurdish population, analyzing the biopolitical mechanisms that may have totalitarian implications for Turkish democracy. In 2023, he served as a Junior Visiting Fellow with the “Dimensions of Europe” program in Graz, where he researched biopolitics and national identity in Turkey. His project explored how biopolitical practices influence national identity and the potential for Turkish rapprochement with the EU on Kurdish issues. Gabriele Leone’s research contributes to the discourse on minority rights and state power in Southeast Europe. Gabriele Leone is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Southeast European Studies (CSEES) for the academic year 2024/2025. In parallel, he serves as tutor for the course on international cooperation, sustainability and peaceat the University of Calabria (Unical), where he continues to engage with themes of cooperation, democracy, and conflict resolution in a transnational context.
Globalising Southeastern Europe 
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